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ABSTRACT
With the increasing attentions of deep learning models, attacks are also upcoming for such models.
For example, an attacker may carefully construct images in specific ways (also referred to as adver-
sarial examples) aiming to mislead the deep learning models to output incorrect classification results.
Similarly, many efforts are proposed to detect and mitigate adversarial examples, usually for certain
dedicated attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel digital watermark based method to generate
adversarial examples for deep learning models. Specifically, partial main features of the watermark
image are embedded into the host image invisibly, aiming to tamper and damage the recognition
capabilities of the deep learning models. We devise an efficient mechanism to select host images
and watermark images, and utilize the improved discrete wavelet transform (DWT) based Patchwork
watermarking algorithm and the modified discrete cosine transform (DCT) based Patchwork water-
marking algorithm. The experimental results showed that our scheme is able to generate a large
number of adversarial examples efficiently. In addition, we find that using the extracted features of
the image as the watermark images, can increase the success rate of an attack under certain con-
ditions with minimal changes to the host image. To ensure repeatability, reproducibility, and code
sharing, the source code is available on GitHub1.
1 Introduction
Deep learning is increasingly been used in image recognition for many different applications such as monitoring of
crowds, surveillance at key installations, and clinical diagnosis. Similar to any technologies, there will be attempts to
find vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the technologies in order to carry out malicious or nefarious activities. Szegedy
et al. [1] revealed that minor perturbation in the image could lead to incorrect identification results in deep learning
models, and introduced the concept of adversarial examples. The latter referred to images that are purposefully crafted
to result in misclassification of deep learning models, for example due to perturbations.
1https://github.com/Y-Xiang-hub/Generate-Adversarial-Examples-By-Digital-Watermarking
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Since the seminal work of Szegedy et al. [1], many other researchers have proposed different schemes to generate
adversarial examples, such as those using gradient variations in deep learning models or elaborate perturbations on
images to generate adversarial examples. Such approaches can also be categorized into white-box approaches and
black-box approaches. Examples of white-box attack approaches include the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [2]
and the DeepFool method [3], both of which are based on gradient design. Some approaches (e.g., Jacobian-based
saliency map attack (JSMA) method [4]) attempt to reduce the number of modified pixels in an image with minimal
interference to the entire image. Examples of black-box approaches include one-pixel attack and local search attack
[5], both of which do not require the attacker to know about the parameters and gradient changes in the targeted deep
learning model.
Existing popular methods for generating adversarial examples generally focus on using gradient variations and crafty
perturbations and ensure subtle perturbations by limiting their Lp norm. We take a different approach in this paper, as
described below:
1. We present two novel and efficient methods for adversarial example generation based on improved water-
marking algorithms. One uses the improved discrete wavelet transform (DWT) watermark algorithm, and the
other applies the modified discrete cosine transform (DCT) watermark algorithm.
2. We provide a set of embedding parameters with excellent performance through large amounts of experiments
to generate adversarial examples. We also propose a scheme that uses the confidence of the host images to
select watermark images, with the aim of making the experiment more efficient.
3. We explore whether the effectiveness of our scheme can be enhanced if we use the features extracted from
watermark as the watermark. The findings suggest that using features as watermarks can result in a higher
success rate and reduce the perturbations of embedding.
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Example Generation
Since Szegedy et al.[1] proposed the concept of adversarial examples, this domain has attracted the attention of the
research community, partly evidenced by the number of methods (e.g., such as those based on gradient) proposed to
generate adversarial examples. For example, Goodfellow et al. [2] suggested FGSM can be used as directed attacks and
undirected attacks against deep learning models based on gradient. DeepFool [3] was also utilized as an undirected
attack, which reportedly results in fewer perturbations than FGSM. Narodytska et al. [5] proposed the single pixel
attack, which can mislead deep learning models by only changing one pixel on the image. The authors also improved
their method as the local search attack, which works well when the total number of pixels of an image is larger.
There has also been the focus to generate adversarial examples [6]. For example, Baluja et al. [7] proposed the
adversarial transformation networks (ATN) to promptly generate adversarial examples using self-supervisor forward
propagation neural networks. Such a method can provide a variety of different types of adversarial examples, targeting
deep learning models. In other words, there are two approaches to generate adversarial examples using ATN. The first
approach is to generate only a perturbation by reconstructing ATN in some way, and the second approach refactors the
input based on regularization (e.g., add noise signal).
Xiao et al. [8] presented a model based on the generative adversarial network (GAN) to generate high-quality adver-
sarial examples in a relatively short time. Simply, GAN is a model consisting of a generator and a discriminator, both
of which are deep learning systems. In their approach, the function of the generator is to generate special adversarial
examples, and the discriminator is to encourage the generated special adversarial example is indistinguishable with the
original data. In other words, both examples generated by the generator together with the original data used to train the
target model should be fed as input to the discriminator. Finally, the generator that successfully passes the test of the
discriminator can produce the special adversarial examples that the target model training by the original data cannot
rightly classify.
Furthermore, Deng et al. [9] proposed a spatial transformed attack method based on attention, which can be used to
search for significative areas to be targeted. Such areas can also be subjected to spatial transformation. The approach
is generally attack-efficient while decreasing the perturbations. In another separate work, Qiu et al. [10] proposed
SemanticAdv to generate a new genre of semantically realistic adversarial examples through attribute-conditioned
image editing. Their approach reportedly has a high success rate on both black-box attacks and white-box attacks, and
can circumvent detection approaches based on pixels and attributes.
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2.2 Applications of Digital Watermarking
Digital watermarking has also been applied to deep learning, such as protecting deep learning models (e.g., see the
scheme of Zhang et al. [11]). In another work, Le et al.[12] proposed a remote watermarking extraction scheme to
ensure flexibility in watermarking-enabled deep learning model protection. Deep learning models can also be applied
in the watermarking domain. For example, Quiring et al. [13] used deep learning model to extract digital watermarking
in images without knowing the underpinning watermarking scheme, and Wen et al. [14] proposed using deep learning
technology to build a robust watermarking system.
Another research direction is to use digital watermarking to mislead the deep learning system. For example, Shafahi et
al. [15] proposed using watermarking to facilitate poisoning attacks against deep learning models. Although most of
the adversarial example attacks using digital watermarking focused on images, it has been suggested that watermarking
can also be utilized in other types of deep learning models. For example, Chen et al. [16] proposed a scheme to utilize
digital watermarks in text, so that text recognition produces incorrect results.
Building on the existing literature, we explore the potential of generating adversarial examples based on the workings
of deep learning models. The basic principle of the deep neural network model for recognizing images is to extract
the features of the images layer by layer, and we think that the features in the images can be influenced in a certain
way to interfere with the recognition of the deep learning model. Embedding digital watermark information into the
image means that features that are difficult to recognize by human vision are somehow added to the image. We will
introduce the work related to the watermarking algorithm in the next section.
2.3 Digital Watermarking Algorithms
Bender et al. [17] proposed a statistical method (i.e., Patchwork) to hide information. In Patchwork, two pixel point
brightness values sets P and Q are selected in the image according to the key, and the digital watermark information is
carried by increasing the brightness value of each pixel point in the P set by k and decreasing the brightness value of
each pixel point in the Q set by k. However, using Patchwork to embed watermarks by changing the image’s statistical
characteristics only hides a very small amount of information in the image (1 bit of information).
In order to increase the capacity of hidden information, Mei et al. [18] proposed a method based on discrete cosine
transform and discrete wavelet transform for embedding image type watermark into the host image. In other words,
their method transforms the host image with a discrete wavelet transform while using a two-dimensional discrete
cosine transform to transform the watermark image. The result of the watermark image transformation is then added
to the high-frequency component of the host image transformation, and the image is restored using an inverse discrete
wavelet transform. Their method also utilizes the human visual system (HVS), since the human eye is sensitive to
changes in smooth areas of the image, but not to changes in contour and insensitive to small changes such as edges,
making it difficult to perceive embedded watermark information.
This motivates us to explore whether any other feature in HVS can be leveraged to change the selection of set P and
set Q method; thus, improving the traditional Patchwork algorithm (where image type data can be embedded into the
host image as the watermark). According to the work of Zhou et al. [19] and the equation for HVS’ sensitivity to RGB
primary colors:
y = 0.299R+ 0.587G+ 0.144B,
where it illustrates that human vision is very sensitive to the green component, but not particularly sensitive to the red
and blue components. The effects of the components on vision are superimposed similarly to the effects of the green
component. Therefore, we choose to use the green component as the set P of the Patchwork algorithm, and the red
and blue components together as the set Q of the Patchwork algorithm. The improved watermarking algorithms can
embed more information in the watermark image into the host image. In other words, we can embed the information
of the watermark image into the host image for color images.
3 Proposed Scheme
In this section, we will describe our proposed scheme designed to generate adversarial examples using digital wa-
termarking. Specifically, we use the improved Patchwork algorithm based on the discrete wavelet transform and the
modified Patchwork algorithm based on discrete cosine transform respectively to generate adversarial examples. We
control two adjustable parameters in the embedding process to embed the watermark image into the host image, and
propose a simple search method to find suitable watermark images. We remark that our approach for generating
adversarial examples focuses on black-box attacks.
We will now give three definitions, as follows:
3
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Embedding strength (Embeds). The embedding strength is a combination of three RGB parameters that are in both
discrete wavelet transform based Patchwork algorithm and the discrete cosine transform based Patchwork
algorithm. The watermarking algorithm embeds the selected watermark image into the host image, and the
embedding strength is simply the strength of the host caused by the embedding of the digital watermark extent
to which the image changes.
Embedding frequency (Embedt). The number of times the watermark image is embedded into the host image.
Confidence (Pc). A measure of the probability or certainty that an image will be recognized as a certain class by a
particular deep learning model.
3.1 Embedding Watermark Process
The improved discrete wavelet transform based Patchwork algorithm reads the host image and the watermark image,
separates the RGB tricolor components of both two images, and operates the separated red component, the green
component, and the blue component as follows. We also remark that the process of the modified discrete cosine
transform based Patchwork algorithm is similar to the following steps of the improved discrete wavelet transform
based Patchwork algorithm.
1. Transform the red component, the green component, and the blue component respectively by discrete wavelet
transform.
2. Multiply the watermark information and Embeds and add the result to the discrete wavelet transformation
matrix of the corresponding host image.
3. Transform the red component, the green component, and the blue component of the host image that have
watermark information respectively by inverse discrete wavelet transform.
4. Finally, the red component, the green component, and the blue component are combined to get the image
with embedded watermark information.
3.2 Choose Host and Watermark Images
In this part, we select the host image and the watermark image, and record data about these images. The entire selection
process comprises the following three steps (see also Fig 1).
1. In the first step, we randomly select the host images in the testing dataset and then use a specific deep learning
model (e.g., VGG16) to identify these host images and record the classification results of the host images with
each confidence level. We select correctly classified images as host images to demonstrate the validity of our
scheme, as demonstrated below.
2. In the next step, we need to choose a class from which we will select the watermark image in the next step.
This class is denoted as Classsecond.
3. In the third and final step, we need to choose a class from which we will select the watermark image. We
have devised a simple method to select Classsecond. For a host image Hx, we choose the second-highest
confidence of all classes as Classsecond. For example, the confidence for the host image is 90% for cars, 9%
for aircraft, and 1% for the remaining categories combined. Then, the class of the aircraft will be selected as
Classsecond.
The above step is then repeated for all other selected host images.
Based on the working principle of deep learning model recognition of images, for images from Classsecond of the
host image, there are potentially more partial features that can be recognized asClasssecond compared to other classes.
Thus, the impact of embedding the images from Classsecond on the model recognition process is greater than in other
categories. Similarly, using higher confidence images Classsecond as watermark images potentially result in a greater
likelihood of causing the model to have classification errors.
Recall in the third step, we select the appropriatewatermark image forHx fromClasssecond. To improve the efficiency
of selecting watermarked images, we design a mechanism to select watermark images quickly. We use a specific deep
learning model to identify all the images in Classsecond. After that, recording the confidence of each image, the
images are sorted according to the confidence from largest to smallest. Finally, the ten images with the highest
confidence are selected as the watermark images, Wi (1 ≤ i ≤ 10, i ∈ Z). In this step, we also do the same
for the other host images as well. In addition, it is possible to select more than ten images or fewer than then ten
images as watermark images. However, selecting too many images will result in a decrease in the efficiency of
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Figure 1: Choose host images and Classsecond
adversarial example generation, and a small number of watermark images will lead to a lower success rate for the
attacks. Therefore, the choice of the number of watermark images depends on the actual demand or application
context. The concrete step is shown as Fig 2.
Figure 2: Choose watermark images
3.3 Set Parameters and Embed Watermarks
In the second part, our goal is to set the appropriate embedding parameters and then embed the watermark image into
the host image to generate the adversarial example. Before starting to embed the watermarked image into the host
image through the watermarking algorithm, two parameters need to be set, namely: Embeds and Embedt.
To generate adversarial examples using the improved discrete wavelet transform based Patchwork algorithm, after
setting Embeds, we embed the W1 into Hx using this watermarking algorithm. Specifically, we perform a total of
ten rounds of embedding W1 into Hx, with the first round embedding W1 5 times into Hx, the tenth round embeds
50 times W1 in Hx, and five intervals of embedding between rounds. We repeat this process for other selected host
images and correspondingWi. In addition, the difference for the modified discrete cosine transform based Patchwork
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algorithm is that embedding W1 1 times into Hx in the first round, and embedding 10 times W1 in Hx in the tenth
round, and 1 interval of embedding between rounds. The specific algorithms for generating adversarial examples are
shown in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 Improved DWT Based Watermarking
Input: host images Imagehost, watermark images Imagewater, Embeds, Embedt, total number of the host im-
ages Totalimage, name of the host image Namehost, name of the watermark image Namewater, three-level dis-
crete wavelet transformDWT3L, one-level discrete wavelet transform operationDWT1L, three-level inverse discrete
wavelet transform operation IDWT3L, three-level componentsCtl, and third low-frequency component Ctlf
Output: watermarked images Candidateimage
1: set Embeds
2: for i = 1 : Totalimage do
3: Namehost = Imagehost[i];
4: for j = 1 : Embedt do
5: read Namehost as img;
6: resize img;
7: read Namewater as wm;
8: resize wm;
9: separate R, G and B channels of img and wm;
10: Ctl =DWT3L(img)
11: Clf =DWT1L(wm)
12: imgR = imgR Ctl of Ctlf ± (EmbedsR) × wm Clf
13: wmedR = IDWT3L(imgR)
14: imgG = imgG Ctl of Ctlf ∓ (EmbedsG) × wm Clf
15: wmedG = IDWT3L(imgG)
16: imgB = imgB Ctl of Ctlf ± (EmbedsB ) × wm Clf
17: wmedB = IDWT3L(imgB)
18: Candidateimage = (wmedR, wmedG, wmedB);
19: save Candidateimage;
20: return
4 Experimental Setup and Results
To demonstrate that our solution is sufficiently fast and scalable in processing images in the dataset, we implement
a prototype of our proposed scheme in this section and evaluate its performance. Prior to the commencement of
recognition and embedding operations, we resize both the original images and the watermark images to adapt batch
operation.
In the evaluation, we use a pre-trained model in Keras for image recognition. Findings of the evaluation on the Kaggle
cat-dog dataset and the CIFAR-10 dataset for five popular deep learning models (i.e., VGG16, ResNet50, Xception,
InceptionV3, and CNN) will be presented. The findings also include multiple single host images of the variation trend
of Pc with increasing Embedt, and the success rate of our attacks in the Kaggle dataset and the CIFAR-10 on these
five deep learning models on the dataset.
We will also present the results for adversarial example generation of DWT based method and DCT based method
respectively in the Kaggle dataset and the CIFAR-10 dataset in Sections 4.1 and subsection:Results on DCT Based
Method, respectively. Additionally, based on the findings of the extensive experiments we performed, we found that
fixing Embeds and then adjusting Embedt is an efficient way and yields a higher success rate.
4.1 Results on DWT Based Method
We set Embeds in the discrete wavelet transform based Patchwork algorithm to generate the adversarial examples as
R = 0.04, G = 0.03, B = 0.08.
Then, we test the watermarking method for generating adversarial examples based on DWT in the Kaggle dataset and
the CIFAR-10 dataset (see Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2).
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Algorithm 2Modified DCT Based Watermarking
Input: host images Imagehost, watermark images Imagewater, Embeds, Embedt, total number of the host images
Totalimage, name of the host imageNamehost, name of the watermark imageNamewater, two-dimensional discrete
cosine transform operationDCT2D. the two-dimensional inverse discrete cosine transform operation IDCT2D, result
matrix of performing DCT2D on Imagehost Mhost, result matrix of performing DCT2D on Imagewater Mwater,
and result matrix of IDCT2D M
Output: watermarked images Candidateimage
1: set Embeds
2: for i = 1 : Totalimage do
3: Namehost = Imagehost[i];
4: for j = 1 : Embedt do
5: read Namehost as img;
6: resize img;
7: read Namewater as wm;
8: resize wm;
9: MhostR =DCT2D(imgR);
10: MwaterR =DCT2D(wmR);
11: MhostR =MhostR + EmbedtR ×MwaterR;
12: MR = IDCT2D(MhostR);
13: MhostG = DCT2D(imgG);
14: MwaterG =DCT2D(wmG);
15: MhostG = MhostG + EmbedtG ×MwaterG;
16: MG = IDCT2D(MhostG);
17: MhostB =DCT2D(imgB);
18: MwaterB = DCT2D(wmB);
19: MhostB =MhostB + EmbedtB ×MwaterB;
20: MB = IDCT2D(MhostB);
21: Candidateimage = (MR, MG,MB);
22: save Candidateimage;
23: return
4.1.1 Kaggle Dataset
On the ResNet50 model, we choose six successful attacks as examples (i.e., three cat and three dog images) to show
the variation trend of Pc with an increase of Embedt on the single host image. The results are shown in Fig 3 and Fig
5. The watermark images are selected according to the processes in Fig 1 and Fig 2. Since there are two classes in this
dataset, when Pc of the host image is less than 50%, it indicates that an error in model identification has occurred.
Figure 3: The variation trend in Pc of the three host images with Embedt using DWT based method on ResNet50 in
the Kaggle dataset (take host images of cats as examples).
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We use the blue polyline in Fig 3 and its corresponding host images with different Embedt in Fig 4 as an example.
From the coordinates of the points in Fig 3, the blue polyline corresponds to the host image which is embedded 5 and
10 times by the watermark image that results in errors for ResNet50.
Figure 4: The results of the single image after embedding the watermark image with different times correspond to the
blue polyline in Fig 3.
In addition, we choose the red polyline in Fig 5 and its corresponding results of the host images in Fig 6 to visualize
the variation trend. We can see from the coordinates of the points in Fig 5 that the red polyline corresponds to the host
image that is embedded 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 times by the watermark image leads the erroneous recognition
in ResNet50.
Figure 5: The variation trend in Pc of the three host images with Embedt using DWT based method on ResNet50 in
the Kaggle dataset (take host images of dogs as examples).
We also evaluate our method on VGG16, InceptionV3 and Xception in Kaggle dataset, whose findings are shown in
Fig 7 and Table 1. The results from using the Kaggle dataset illustrates that the success rate of adversarial examples
generation improves with an increase in Embedt. We also know from the results that the total success rate of the
attack is highest for ResNet50 and lowest for VGG16.
The total success rate here means if the host image embedded with the watermark image has misled the deep learning
model at least once during ten rounds, we will record it as a successful example. We observe from Fig 3 that embedding
the watermark image into the host image for more rounds may lead to failure in generating the adversarial example
(e.g., the blue polyline and the red polyline in Fig 3). That is also the reason that the total success rate is higher than
the tenth round’s success rate.
4.1.2 CIFAR-10 Dataset
We now present the evaluation findings of RestNet50, VGG16 and CNN using the CIFAR-10 dataset. The results of
the single images in the CIFAR-10 dataset are shown in Fig 8 and Fig 10. For the variation trend of the single images,
8
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Figure 6: The results of the single image after embedding the watermark image with different times correspond to the
red polyline in Fig 5.
Figure 7: The success rate variation trend in the Kaggle dataset with different models applying DWT based method.
we select two successful examples to display in CIFAR-10 (one is from ResNet50 and the other is from VGG16). The
watermark images are selected according to the processes in Fig 1 and Fig 2.
For ResNet50, the result of recognizing the host image in Fig 9 as the second class is Pc = 95.3%. This means that
the host image is identified as the second class (automobile) by ResNet50. Additionally, the tenth class (truck) with
the Pc = 3.89% is Classsecond for this host image on ResNet50.
The variation trend of Pc of the host image withEmbedt on ResNet50 is shown in Fig 8. It can be seen from Fig 8 that
when Pc of the second class (automobile) of the host image is no longer the maximum among all classes, it indicates
that the attack is successful. Thus, the host image which is embedded 15, 20, 25 and 30 times by the watermark image
are successful examples. The corresponding images are shown in Fig 9.
We will also describe the result of a single host image on VGG16 in the CIFAR-10 dataset below. The host image
is recognized as the ninth class (ship) with Pc of 97.1%. Thus, the host image is classified as the ninth class and the
Classsecond of which is the first class (airplane) with Pc of 1.3%.
The variation trend of the Pc of the host image with Embedt on VGG16 is shown in Fig 10. When Pc of the eighth
class (ship) of the host image is not the highest among ten categories, this implies the success of the attack. Therefore,
the host images embedded 30, 35, 40, 45 and 50 times by the watermark image are successful examples (see Fig 11).
We test the variation trend of the success rate with different models using the DWT based method, and the corre-
sponding total success rate using the CIFAR-10 dataset. The experimental results of the DWT based method in the
CIFAR-10 are shown in Fig 12 and Table 1.
9
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Figure 8: The variation trend in Pc of the host image with Embedt using DWT based method on ResNet50 in the
CIFAR-10 dataset.
Figure 9: The results of the single image after embedding the watermark image with different times respond to Fig 8.
The results in the CIFAR-10 indicate that, similar to the results in the Kaggle dataset, the success rate of generating
adversarial examples goes up as Embedt increases, and the total success rate of the attack is highest for CNN and
lowest for VGG16.
4.2 Results on DCT Based Method
We set Embeds in the discrete cosine transform based Patchwork algorithm for adversarial example generation as
R = 0.04, G = 0.01, B = 0.08.
We test the DCT based watermarking method for adversarial examples generation using both Kaggle and CIFAR-10
datasets. There are ten classes in the CIFAR-10 dataset. When Pc of the host image is not the highest among ten
classes, the deep learning model outputs false identification results.
Table 1: Total success rate in the Kaggle and the CIFAR-10 datasets (DWT)
ResNet50 V GG16 InceptionV 3 Xception CNN
Kaggle 48.5% 38.1% 42.3% 41.0% -
CIFAR − 10 72.4% 70.3% - - 88.2%
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Figure 10: The variation trend in Pc of a host image with Embedt using DWT based method on VGG16 in the
CIFAR-10 dataset.
Figure 11: The results of the single image after embedding the watermark image with different times respond Fig 10.
Our test results of the single images in the CIFAR-10 dataset echo those of the Kaggle dataset. Thus, we show only
the variation trend of the success rate with different models of the DCT based method, and the corresponding total
success rate next.
4.2.1 Kaggle Dataset
The results in the Kaggle dataset in Fig 13 and Table 2 illustrate that the success rate of adversarial examples generation
increases as Embedt increases. We also know from the results that the total success rate of the attack is highest for
ResNet50 and lowest for VGG16.
4.2.2 CIFAR-10 Dataset
The results in the CIFAR-10 in Fig 14 and Table 2 indicate that the success rate of generating adversarial examples
increases with Embedt. The total success rate of the attack is also shown to be highest for CNN and lowest for
VGG16.
5 Analysis and Evaluation
5.1 DWT and DCT Methods Comparison
Through extensive experiments, we determined that the DCT based Patchwork watermarking algorithm generates can-
didate adversarial examples at a fast pace and requires fewer iterations to embed the watermark image into the host
image. In contrast, the DWT based Patchwork watermarking algorithm is slower in generating adversarial examples,
11
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Figure 12: The success rate variation trend in the CIFAR-10 dataset with different models applying DWT based
method.
Figure 13: The success rate variation trend in the Kaggle dataset with different models applying DCT based method.
and the successful generation of adversarial examples requires more time in the number of watermark images embed-
ded into the host images. Specifically, the DCT and the DWT algorithm produce a candidate image on an average of
0.01 to 0.10 seconds and 0.50 to 2.00 seconds, respectively.
However, the success rate of the DWT based watermarking algorithm is significantly higher in the datasets we tested
on the corresponding deep learning model than on the DCT watermarking algorithm. Also, for some combinations
of the host image and the watermark image, the use of the DCT based watermarking algorithm did not result in the
successful generation of adversarial examples. In the case of using the same host image and the watermark image, the
DWT based watermarking algorithm can successfully generate the adversarial example.
Therefore, we can combine these two algorithms into one system. Specifically, we first use the DCT based watermark-
ing algorithm to generate an adversarial example, and if that fails, we will use the DWT based watermarking algorithm
to generate the adversarial example. This new combined system will improve the overall success rate of our scheme
(i.e., generating adversarial examples), at the expense of time and computing overheads.
Table 2: Total success rate in the Kaggle and the CIFAR-10 datasets (DCT)
ResNet50 V GG16 InceptionV 3 Xception CNN
Kaggle 34.0% 17.6% 20.4% 30.1% -
CIFAR − 10 39.0% 36.8% - - 69.9%
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Figure 14: The success rate variation trend in the CIFAR-10 dataset with different models applyingDCT based method.
Figure 15: Extract feature from the watermark image.
Table 3: Total success rate on VGG16 in Kaggle by embedding the images and the features with different ratio of RGB
based on the DCT based watermarking
0.04 : 0.01 : 0.08 0.08 : 0.08 : 0.08
Image 17.6% 61.6%
Feature 14.7% 34.8%
Figure 16: Results of embedding the image and the feature with Embeds R : G : B = 0.04 : 0.01 : 0.08.
Figure 17: Results of embedding the image and the feature with Embeds R : G : B = 0.08 : 0.08 : 0.08.
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5.2 Enhancement by Embedding Features
Based on a large number of experiments, we also found that in the DWT based watermarking algorithm and the DCT
based watermarking algorithm, when the proportion of three RGB parameters in the Embeds is 4 : n : 8 (N ≤ 3,
n ∈ N ), the success rate of generating adversarial examples is relatively high, and has relatively little effect on the
original host image.
In order to enhance the success rate of the DCT based watermarking algorithm, we attempted to adjust Embeds in the
algorithm. We set Embeds in the DCT based watermarking algorithm as
R = 0.08, G = 0.08, B = 0.08.
We tested the new settings of the DCT based watermarking algorithm on VGG16 using the Kaggle dataset (since from
the evaluation findings, our designed attack has the weakest performance for VGG16).
The effect due to embedding of the watermark image into the host image is reported in Fig 15 (where we used functions
in Keras to extract the features from the middle layer of deep learning models). From Table 3, we observe that the
success rate becomes higher than before when we only changeEmbeds. However, the embedding is less effective than
before in Fig 16. To enhance our scheme, we considered embedding the feature images of the watermark images into
the host images. This is because while feature images have less information in total, they have more useful information.
This can ensure the success of our attacks while reducing the effect on the host images when changingEmbeds in Fig
17 (these four examples in Fig 16 and Fig 17 embedded the watermark image ten times).
In Table 3 and Fig 17, we can see that the results of embedding the feature images into the host images are clearly
better than the original experiments in the above section (i.e., the improved success rate of our attack, even though
changes to the image are minimized).
In summary, the key point of our method is to adjust the balance amongEmbeds, Embedt and the type of embedding,
in order to maintain the high success rate and effectiveness of watermarking algorithms in generating adversarial
examples. One potential future research is to explore other alternative parameters or parameter settings.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel approach for generating adversarial examples. The approach utilizes the dis-
crete wavelet transform based Patchwork watermarking algorithm and discrete cosine transform based Patchwork
watermarking algorithm to embed watermark images into the host images to generate adversarial examples. Such an
approach has applications in many real-world settings, such as adversarial scenarios such as battlefields. Specifically,
in our work, we designed a simple scheme to filter the watermark images and a corresponding algorithm to embed the
watermark images into the host images.
The experimental results showed that our approach can generate adversarial examples quickly and effectively. The
highest success rate achieved using this discrete wavelet based watermarking method is on the Kaggle and the CIFAR-
10 datasets, respectively at 48.5% and 88.2%. The discrete cosine based watermarking approach has the highest
success rate of 34.0% and 69.9% on the Kaggle dataset and the CIFAR-10 dataset, respectively.
We also examined the results of embedding the host image effect relative to the original scheme after replacing the
watermarked image with its feature image. Hence, future research includes extending our approach to generating
adversarial examples for other content such as audio and video.
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